“The parties will act in good faith to conclude the legal agreements necessary to complete the transaction.” In general, an agreement to negotiate in good faith, as seen in the above version, is not applicable because it is: despite these promising prospects for recognition and the application of a clause that must be negotiated in good faith, two potential problems may arise. One of them is the determination of the content of the duty to negotiate in good faith. While it is true that official opinions now define “a good faith negotiating obligation,” it appears to be a very broad concept. Then there is the question of the importance of the language of “bad faith,” section 2.1.15 used to determine pre-contract liability, not “contrary to good faith and fair trade.” Some commentators have suggested that this is a narrower approach to liability and have interpreted the term “bad intent negotiations” in section 2.1.15 in the form of a limitation of its scope, so as to bring “bad faith belief” closer to “fraud”. However, this view cannot be maintained, in part because Article 2.1.15 is expressly recognized by the authors of the ICP as a specific application of the principle of good faith and fair trade enshrined in Article 1.7. The difficulty, however, remains that the CCIP does not provide a definition of “good faith and fair action,” although it is clear that it refers to a good faith and fair trade trade standard, which must be understood in an objective sense. A recent decision by the High Court of England and Wales is a significant departure from the approach taken by the English courts with regard to the applicability of bargaining agreements. In Emirates Trading Agency LLC v. Prime Mineral Experts Private Limited Limited  EWHC 2104 (Comm), Mr. Justice Teare stated that a temporary obligation to resolve disputes through “friendly conversations” was applicable. In that decision, the Court was influenced by judicial motivations in a number of cases in Singapore and Australia.
The Court found that the parties negotiating a contract expect each party to act exclusively in the interests of the party. However, there are strict exceptions to this general remuneration, in which the courts may find a duty in good faith to negotiate. These exceptions generally occur when one party reasonably relies on the other to obtain information, which leads to a situation in which one party can, for the most part, give the decision of the other party. If the parties have very different levels of access to information and leverage, the weaker party may have “the right not to be independent.” When negotiating contracts, economic operators are expected to vigorously pursue their own interests.